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1. Introduction 
The modern theory of capital structure began with the famous proposition of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958) that described the conditions of capital structure irrelevance.  Since then, many 
theories of capital structure have been developed including trade off theory, pecking order 
theory, agency cost theory, life cycle theory and flexibility theory. After so many innovations, 
capital structure remains one of the most controversial and debatable issue in corporate finance. 
The key issues are as follows. First, an immense gap exists between theories and practice. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) found that less than 50% of theoretical ideas find some support 
among managers. Second, there are big differences in the researchers’ opinion. For example, 
Chirinko and Singha (2000), Leary and Roberts (2010) and Frank and Goyal (2003) claim that 
trade-off theory drives capital structure decisions while Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
Lemmon and Zender (2008) claim that pecking-order theory drives capital structure. Third, there 
is difference among opinions about the direction that future work on capital structure should 
take. For instance, Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that asymmetric information theories of capital 
structure are not promising. However, the stream of research related to asymmetric information 
has not stopped since then.
1
 Furthermore, the financial crisis during 2008 and 2009 showed that 
corporate managers appeared to lack an understanding of the role of asymmetric information. 
The market for mortgage-backed securities, which many believe was at the core of financial 
crisis, involved asymmetric information between investors and issuers. Various scandals, such as 
the one involving Bernie Madoff, illustrate the depth of asymmetric information problems 
between firms’ insiders and investors.  
                                                          
1
 See, for example, Klein (2002) and Miglo (2010, 2011).  
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         The present paper attempts to analyze issues described above. As stated above only 50% of 
theories have support among managers. One can say that this gap will disappear eventually as 
long as the quality of existing and new theories improves over time. An alternative idea is that 
managers of real companies were not necessarily outstanding students in the past and that they 
were not always able to understand all capital structure theories taught at school. In the present 
paper we develop an intermediate view namely that this gap can be explained by current 
educational and publishing practicing existing in the field of capital structure. We feel that the 
gap is too big to be either disappearing naturally or being explained by the fact that capital 
structure managers are not able to understand existing theories.  
           To evaluate current educational practices we analyze 161 projects related to capital 
structure prepared by undergraduate and graduate students majoring in finance or in business.   
With the help of spreadsheet analysis students first had to find an optimal capital structure for a 
given company. Spreadsheet analysis is mostly based on the trade-off between tax advantages of 
debt and increasing risk from debt financing. Then these students had to describe other factors 
that have not been taken into consideration in the spreadsheet analysis, which affect managers’ 
decisions on company’s capital structure. In the present paper we summarize students’ answers 
and record the frequency of different theories and factors appearing in their projects. Several 
tables have been made to present information from the projects by cataloguing these students in 
different ways. Through studying these tables, we can find out students’ preferences for different 
factors and theories of capital structure. 
          We argue that current educational practices are such that educators mostly focus on one or 
maybe two most popular theories (Trade-off theory and Pecking order theory) and that students 
have much smaller knowledge about other theories (Agency cost, Life cycle theory, Debt and 
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discipline and Debt and flexibility). The same is true for the majority of textbooks. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) argue that managers take decisions based on the current financial situation, past 
experiences, and informal criteria like financial flexibility and credit ratings. Educators should 
spend more time on teaching all these factors especially given that some of them have become 
quite important in theoretical research as well. Our analysis show that top students (students with 
good marks and who probably were more successful in learning different theories prior to the 
project)  have much broader view about capital structure management than other students. 
However the views of the former are not close enough to those of managers. This shows that a 
potential exists for broadening and deepening capital structure education. 
        We also feel that another reason for the gap between theory and practice is that educators 
focus mostly on normative aspects of theory, and not on positive aspects of theory and its 
applications. As a result students may be aware about existing models but are not able to apply 
these models in real life when they become managers. We feel that this is especially true for 
asymmetric information and agency cost theories which are without doubt most complicated 
theories technically. Educators should find a way to explain practical applications of those 
theories. 
With regard to the gap in researchers’ opinion, we argue that educational practices favor 
the trade-off theory to asymmetric information based theories and agency theories (perhaps 
because of difficulty of the latter). This should be corrected. Students who do not study hard are 
similar to managers in terms of mentioning trade-off theory more frequently compared to 
asymmetric information. Good students still like trade-off theory but also have quite a positive 
opinion about asymmetric information, firm flexibility or agency based theories as well.  
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 Finally in terms of debate about future development of capital structure theory, we 
disagree with Harris and Raviv (1991) opinion that asymmetric information theories are less 
promising. We feel that existing asymmetric information theories are not sufficient and this is the 
reason why these theories have less support than the trade-off theory among managers and 
students.  
         At the same time given that the gap between theory and practice is very large, we agree 
with Harris and Raviv (1991) in that the door is still widely open for new theory of capital 
structure which can be helpful to make a bridge between managers and students which can be 
helpful to the future students to know more clear about capital structure.       
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in details the students’ 
report. Section 3 presents a review of capital structure theories which were learned by students. 
These are basically all major known theories of capital structure. Section 4 describes the 
students’ body. Section 5 presents the results of students’ reports analysis and compared with 
managers’ opinions and the conclusion is drawn in Section 6. 
2. Description of students’ project report 
Students analyze a firm suggested by the instructor in the statement of assignment. Different 
classes deal usually with different companies. By going through the project, students should 
answer several questions to the company’s capital structure. These questions are:  
1. What is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio? 
2. Is the firm’s debt/equity ratio low or high? Compare debt/equity ratio with other firms at 
the same industry or related industries. 
3. Is the firm’s current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm’s financial policy or by the 
current market conditions? Look at the firm’s debt/equity ratio over the last few years. 
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4. What is the firm’s optimal capital structure according to WACC (weighted average cost 
of capital) approach? 
5. If current debt/equity ratio different from optimal, then what factors, in your opinion, 
which are not taken into consideration in the spreadsheet analysis may explain this 
difference? 
Students are encouraged to apply capital structure theories which they learn from textbooks 
and lectures. These theories are Pecking-Order Theory, Trade-Off Theory, Agency Cost, 
Flexibility and some others.  
Questions 1, 2 and 4 deal with financial calculations. By doing so, students can find out the 
company’s Debt/Equity Ratio and the WACC. WACC is the expected return on all of a 
company’s securities. It is calculated by multiplying the cost of each capital component by its 
proportional weight and then summing: 
WACC= (E/V)rE+ (D/V)rD(1-TC) 
Here D and E are the market value of the firm’s debt and equity, V=D+E is the firm’s total 
market value, rD and rE are the cost of debt and equity, and TC is the marginal corporate tax rate. 
Students take tax into consideration, since interest paid on a firm’s borrowing can be deducted 
from taxable income, which is the so called tax benefit. 
To get the optimal capital structure, students change D/(D+E) ratio from 0% to 100% as 
hypotheses, and calculate several financial parameters for different ratios. Then they find one 
that has minimal WACC and respectively maximal market value for the firm.  
More specifically, students first calculate β: 
β=[1+(1- TC)D/E] β0
2
 
Then, they calculate rE and rD by the following equations: 
                                                          
2
 This is Ito formula. β0 refers to the “unlevered” beta of the company. 
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rE=Current Short Term Government Rate + β×Risk Premium 
rD=Risk-Free Interest + Default Premium
3
 
Then, they calculate the WACC based on the equation above, list all the WACC for different 
D/(D+E) ratios, and finally find the minimum WACC from the list which corresponds to the 
optimal capital structure. 
With regard to question 3, one student shows that the Oracle’s D/E ratio was growing from 
2005 to 2008. With a further study, he believes a part of the reason for the growing D/E ratio is 
Oracle’s financial policy, when the company aggressively purchased several competitors during 
that period and accumulated a large amount of debt.  
As to question 5, one student finds that the optimal debt/equity ratio (based on spreadsheet 
analysis) of eBay’s is significantly higher than its current ratio. The student suggests that this 
happened because high bankruptcy cost of the industry and the needs for flexibility for future 
financing are not taken into consideration in the WACC approach. He holds the view that eBay 
invested so much money, time and effort to develop specific products, that the consequence can 
be very serious if it fails due to a large amount of debt. The primary reason is the company’s 
large proportion of intellectual property which cannot be quickly converted to cash in a financial 
distress situation. Moreover, the e-commerce industry is still in its growth stage, the future 
financing requirements of the industry are unknown, therefore issuing stocks to finance today’s 
capital needs leaves firms with more flexibility for future financing than borrowing money. 
Another student finds that the agency cost for Microsoft is relatively low, and he explains 
this phenomenon by pointing out that the biggest shareholder of Microsoft – Bill Gates – has 
                                                          
3
 Default premium depends on the company’s  credit rating that ranges from  AAA to D. It depends in turn on such 
parameters as interest coverage ratio.  
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been deeply involved in company’s management. When there are fewer conflicts between 
managers and shareholders, there would be less agency cost. 
To help with the project, all students are given a spreadsheet containing information they 
need – step by step – to develop their reports4.  
This spreadsheet is divided into following parts
5
: 
1. Input data; 
2. Interest coverage ratios, rating of debt, default spreads, interest rates and probabilities of 
default. 
3. Current situation; 
4. Capital structure and cost of capital calculation; 
5. Main results. 
Students are supposed to find most data about the company (earnings, expenditures, 
depreciation etc.) from edumarketinsight website (educational version of Standard and Poors 
data base) for which they had passwords provided together with their textbook (usually it was 
“Principles of corporate finance” by Brealey and Myers). Default spreads, risk premiums and 
other information for point 2 could be found on bondsonline website or on Federal Reserve 
website. Points 3-5 represent calculations. 
3. Capital Structure Theories 
This section describes capital structure theories which students learnt in class or from a 
recommended textbook that for most classes was Brealey and Myers (2006) “Principles of 
corporate finance” of different editions. The section also discusses some challenges faced by 
                                                          
4
 
We collect data from 2 different groups of students. One group were conducted before 2006, and the other after 2006. Data collected from both 
groups are similar in content, except for the construction. 
5 For more details, see Appendix 1.
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each theory that provides a basic for further discussions about existing practices in capital 
structure management and education.
6
 As the reader will see, the trade-off theory is usually 
taking more time and efforts from the instructor which also reflect the situation in Brealey and 
Myers (2006) textbook as well as in most other books especially finance textbooks for 
undergraduate students. 
3.1. Trade-off theory 
            In contrast to dividends, interest paid on debt reduces the firm’s taxable income. Debt also 
increases the probability of bankruptcy. Trade-off theory suggests that capital structure reflects a 
trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and the expected costs of bankruptcy (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973). Consider a firm that generates a random cash flow R  that is uniformly 
distributed between 0  and R . The firm faces a constant tax rate T on corporate income. If the 
earnings are insufficient to cover the promised debt payment, D , there is a deadweight loss of 
kR that is used up in the process. This loss can include direct bankruptcy costs such as fees paid 
to lawyers and indirect bankruptcy costs such as losses due to general lack of confidence in the 
firm. If earnings are large enough ( DR  ), equity holders receive )1)(( TDR  . Otherwise, 
they receive nothing. The market value of debt dV   equals
2
)1( kD
R
D
D
R
DR 


. Here  
R
DR 
 
is the probability that DR   and 
R
D
  is the probability of default. If DR  , the creditors receive
D  and they receive on average 
2
)1( kD 
 if the firm defaults. The market value of equity eV    
equals )1)(
2
( TD
DR
R
DR


. The firm’s value V  equals      
                                                          
6
 For a more detailed review of capital structure theory see, for instance, Miglo (2010). 
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The firm’s choice of leverage is determined by maximizingV . The first-order condition with 
respect to D  is 
                                                                   
kT
RT
D


1
                                                          (2) 
3.1.1 Expected Bankruptcy Costs and Debt 
If k  is higher in Equation 2, the equilibrium level of D  should be lower. As the expected 
bankruptcy costs increase, the advantages of using equity also increase. This result has several 
interpretations. Large firms should have more debt because they are more diversified and have 
lower default risk. Tangible assets suffer a smaller loss of value when firms go into distress. 
Hence, firms with more tangible assets, such as airplane manufacturers, should have higher 
leverage compared to those that have more intangible assets, such as research firms. Growth 
firms tend to lose more of their value than non-growth firms when they go into distress. Thus, 
theory predicts a negative relationship between leverage and growth. Empirical evidence by 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Frank and Goyal (2003) generally support the above predictions.  
3.1.2 Taxes and Debt 
When T  increases in Equation 2, debt should also increase because higher taxes lead to a 
greater tax advantage of using debt. Hence, firms with higher tax rates should have higher debt 
ratios compared to firms with lower tax rates. Inversely, firms that have substantial non-debt tax 
shields such as depreciation should be less likely to use debt than firms that do not have these tax 
shields. If tax rates increase over time, debt ratios should also increase. Debt ratios in countries 
where debt has a much larger tax benefit should be higher than debt ratios in countries whose 
debt has a lower tax benefit.  
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The evidence, however, is mixed. Graham (2000) finds some support for tax factor. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) find that non-debt tax shields and the use of debt are positively 
correlated. According to Wright (2004), leverage in the corporate sector was remarkably stable 
between 1900 and 2002 despite large differences in tax rates. A survey of 392 CFOs by Graham 
and Harvey (2001) finds that 45 percent of the respondents agree that tax considerations play an 
important role in their capital structure choices. 
3.1.3 Debt and Profitability 
 As suggested in Equation 2, if R  increases, D  should also increase. Thus, more 
profitable firms should have more debt. Expected bankruptcy costs are lower and interest tax 
shields are more valuable for profitable firms. Empirical studies typically find a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Fama and French, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
 
3.1.4 Debt Conservatism  
 Although trade-off theory predicts that the marginal tax benefit of debt should be equal to 
the marginal expected bankruptcy cost, the empirical evidence is mixed. Some researchers argue 
that the former is greater than the latter because direct bankruptcy costs are small and the level of 
debt is below optimal (Graham, 2000). Others find that indirect bankruptcy costs can total as 
much as 25 percent to 30 percent of assets value and are thus comparable with tax benefits of 
debt (Molina, 2005; Almeida and Philippon, 2007). Additionally, including personal taxation in 
the basic model can reduce the tax advantage of debt (Green and Hollifield, 2003; Gordon and 
Lee, 2007) because tax rates on the return from equity such as dividends or capital gain are often 
reduced. 
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3.1.5 Target Debt Level 
Debt changes should be dictated by the difference between current level and the level of 
debt predicted by Equation 2. In the recent literature, the continuous process of adjusting capital 
structure toward the target ratio has been called “target reversion” or “mean reversion” (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003). The evidence usually confirms mean 
reversion (Fama and French, 2002; Kayan and Titman, 2007). Different opinions exist about the 
speed of capital structure adjustments. Some researchers find that these adjustments are too slow 
(Fama and French, 2002) while others contend that large adjustments are costly (Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2000). Deviations from the target can then be gradually removed over time (Leary and 
Roberts, 2010). Conducting econometric research on mean reversion remains challenging. The 
major difficulty is that the target debt-to-equity ratio is unobservable. Chang and Dasgupta 
(2007) show, for example, that even purely random financing can lead to mean reversion in 
simulated data. 
In their projects students provided their opinion about the trade-off theory. As follows 
from Section 2, the spreadsheet analysis takes into account taxes and also increasing risk from 
debt financing through changes in interest coverage ratio and changes in firm’s beta. The 
spreadsheet ignores to some degree the magnitude of bankruptcy cost which is not directly 
calculated so many students expressed their opinion about that part of trade-off theory. In 
addition some of them made comments about the spreadsheet analysis as a whole which reflect 
their perception of trade-off theory in general.   
3.2. Asymmetric information theories of capital structure  
 The key element of these theories is asymmetric information between firm’s insiders and 
outsiders. Information asymmetries exist in almost every facet of corporate finance and 
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complicate managers’ ability to maximize firm values. Managers of good quality firms face the 
challenge of directly convincing investors about the true quality of their firm especially if this 
concerns future performance. As a result, investors try to incorporate indirect evidence in their 
valuation of firm performance by analyzing information-revealing actions including capital 
structure choice. 
3.2.1 Pecking-order theory   
 Myers and Majluf (1984) set forth pecking order theory. Equity is dominated by internal 
funds in pecking order theory. Low-quality firms use equity as much as internal funds but high-
quality firms prefer internal funds because shares issued by the company can only be sold with 
discount (i.e. below their true value) because of imperfect information problems. Similarly debt 
dominates equity. Debt suffers from miss valuation less than equity. The same holds if the firm 
has available assets-in-place. Hence a "pecking order" emerges: internal funds, debt, and equity 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
           The empirical evidence on pecking order theory is mixed. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999), Lemmon and Zender (2008), and a survey of New York Stock Exchange firms by 
Kamath (1997) find support for pecking order while Chirinko and Singha (2000) and Leary and 
Roberts (2010) do not. Frank and Goyal (2003) show that the greatest support for pecking order 
occurs among large firms.           
 The announcement of issuing stock drives down the stock price. Empirically, the 
announcements of equity issues result in significant negative stock price reactions (Masulis and 
Korwar, 1986; Antweiler and Frank, 2006).  
 Good-quality firms tend to use internal funds for financing as much as possible. Because 
low-quality firms do not have as much profits and retained earnings as high-quality firms, they 
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use external sources, usually debt, more frequently. This helps to explain the described above 
puzzle about the negative correlation between debt and profitability. 
Pecking order theory predicts that a higher extent of asymmetric information reduces the 
incentive to issue equity. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. D’Mello and Ferris (2000) and 
Bharath, Pasquariello, and Wu (2008) support the prediction that pecking order theory is more 
likely to hold when the extent of asymmetric information is large. Choe, Masulis, and Nanda 
(1993) find that equity issues are more frequent when the economy is doing well and information 
asymmetry is low. Yet, Frank and Goyal (2003) find the greatest support for pecking order 
theory among large firms that are expected to face the least severe adverse selection problems 
because they receive better coverage by equity analysts. 
 In the research students gave their insights regarding this theory and whether the 
company had practiced the pecking order theory as the base to use internal funds-debt over 
equity. The students gave their insights about why firms have a preference towards using internal 
funds over other sources of funds as supported by the pecking order theory. 
3.2.2 Signaling                 
             In the pecking order model, good quality firms have to use internal funds to avoid 
adverse selection problems and losing value. These firms cannot signal their quality by changing 
their capital structure. In signaling theory capital structure serves as a signal of private 
information (Ross, 1977). The main prediction of this theory is that the market reaction on debt 
issues (more generally, on leverage-increasing transactions such as issuing convertible debt, 
repurchasing shares, and debt for equity swaps) is positive. Similarly, the market reaction on 
equity issues (or leverage-decreasing transactions) is negative. Leland and Pyle (1977) obtain the 
same results by using managerial risk-aversion instead of a bankruptcy penalty. 
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 A negative share price reaction on the announcement of equity issues is usually 
consistent with empirical evidence, as discussed in the previous section (similar for leverage-
decreasing transactions). Evidence on the positive market reaction on leverage-increasing 
transactions (with the exception of debt issues) also supports signaling theory (Masulis, 1980; 
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Baker, Powell, and Veit, 2003).  The evidence on the announcement 
of debt issues does not support signaling theories. Eckbo (1986) as well as Antweiler and Frank 
(2006) find insignificant changes in stock prices in response to straight corporate debt issues.  
If a separating equilibrium exists, high-quality firms issue debt and low-quality firms 
issue equity. The empirical prediction is that firm value (or profitability) and the debt-to-equity 
ratio is positively related. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. Most empirical studies report a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability as discussed earlier. In a similar spirit, 
some studies document the superior absolute performance of equity-issuing firms before and 
immediately after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Several studies 
examine long-term firm performance following capital structure changes. Shah (1994) reports 
that business risk falls after leverage-increasing exchange offers but rises after leverage-
decreasing exchange offers. Jain and Kini (1994), Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), and 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) document the long-run operating underperformance of equity issuing 
firms compared to non-issuing firms. 
3.3. Agency cost-based theories of capital structure  
 Agency costs arise because managers do not necessarily act in the best interests of 
shareholders who also may not act in the best interests of creditors. Including agency costs in the 
basic model can help to explain some problems of trade-off theory discussed above such as debt 
conservatism.  
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 Shareholders-creditors conflict 
If an investment yields large returns, equity holders capture most of the gains. If, however, 
the investment fails, debt holders bear the consequences. As a result, equity holders may benefit 
from investing in highly risky projects, even if the projects are value decreasing. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) call this the “asset substitution effect.” Debt holders can correctly anticipate 
equity holders’ future behavior. This leads to a decrease in the value of debt and reduces the 
incentive to issue debt. Myers (1977) observes that when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the 
near future, equity holders may have no incentive to contribute new capital to invest in value-
increasing projects. Equity holders bear the entire cost of the investment, but the returns from the 
investment may be captured mainly by the debt holders (“debt overhang”).   
 On the other hand, some agency theories favor higher debt. For example, Jensen (1986) 
argues that debt improves the discipline of an entrenched manager (so called “debt and 
discipline” theory). The evidence confirms that firms use leverage as a disciplinary device for 
managers. For example, firms reduced their leverage after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2004) that 
required more reliable financial information and hence reduced the extent of agency problems 
(Bertus, Jahera, and Yost, 2008). Jensen and Meckling (1976) contend that choosing debt instead 
of equity allows for the insiders’ fraction of equity to remain high and thus improves their 
incentive to work in the interests of shareholders. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2005) and 
Hackbarth (2008) present behavioral models in which an overconfident manager chooses higher 
debt levels than does a rational manager. The overall effect of agency problems on debt level is 
difficult to quantify. Additionally, the general importance of the asset substitution problem is 
under debate (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999). In their survey of chief financial officers (CFOs), 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find this problem unimportant. 
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3.4. Flexibility theory of capital structure and life cycle theory of capital structure 
Firms in the development stage have little favorable track record (i.e., credit ratings) of 
borrowing (Diamond, 1991) and are most likely to be turned down for credit when they need it 
the most. Thus, firms in the development stage that have little financial flexibility will abstain 
from issuing risky debt and will instead issue equity. Firms in the growth stage begin generating 
positive earnings and have more financial flexibility than developing firms. Accordingly, these 
firms rely on debt financing to fund their growth options as they face less financing constraints 
and as they expect to repay their debt with growing future earnings. Thus, firms in the growth 
stage tend to have high leverage ratios. Firms in the maturity stage generate large cash flows 
from assets already in place and rely mainly on self-financing for their investment needs. They 
are more concerned with servicing debt they raised during the growth stage rather than they are 
with issuing more debt because they expect future cash flows to deteriorate. Accordingly, mature 
firms prefer to maintain moderate debt levels.  
        Flexibility theory finds some support in empirical studies (Byoun, 2008) and managers’ 
surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001). This theory helps to explain why small and risky firms 
issue equity and why these firms do not follow pecking-order theory. Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
develop a theoretical model that analyzes optimal capital structure policy for a firm that values 
flexibility in the presence of personal taxes and transaction costs. The importance of financial 
flexibility as compared to major theories of capital structure remains an open question. More 
work that compares flexibility theory with other theories is expected. Also it was noted that 
many young firms especially venture firms do not issue common equity but rather convertible 
preferred equity which resembles debt more than equity.  
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           Life cycle theory of capital structure argues that besides financial flexibility there are 
other factors which can explain financing patterns of firms in different stages of their 
development (Damodaran, 2003). Start-up firms do not have much profit, so the tax advantage of 
debt is not as important as for a mature firm. The start-up firms do not require incentives for 
managers since there is no large separation between ownership and management like in the case 
of big public corporations. This leads to the idea that mature firms value debt more compared to 
start-up firms. To what extent the life cycle theory represents a separate theory of capital 
structure rather than a combination of arguments from other theories remains an open question. 
Thus in this part of the research students were required to apply the Life Cycle theory in their 
report and find out if there was any practical application of the propositions. 
      Several major conclusions emerge from the development of capital structure theory over the 
past 20 years. First, researchers have extensively tested trade-off and pecking order theories. 
Taken separately, these theories cannot explain certain important facts about capital structure. In 
the future, financial economists need to continue developing dynamic versions of each theory or 
to develop new models that incorporate both trade-off and pecking order ideas. Second, a 
popular line of inquiry has emerged based on surveys of managers about their capital structure 
decisions. For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) report a large gap between theory and 
practice. Third, signaling theory of capital structure lacks empirical support regarding some of its 
core predictions. However, several new theories have emerged that contradict the notion of 
signaling quality through debt issuance. More research may be required to create new models 
that can compete with trade-off and pecking order theories.  
 During the course of their finance studies the students learned each of the theories 
described above in the chapter. The amount of time instructors spend on teaching each particular 
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theory and its depth relative to other theories correspond approximately to the presentation in this 
chapter. The reader can see a slight dominance of trade-off theory, for example, in terms of the 
volume of material, the presence of quantitative part and a number of implications.   
4. Student Body 
The students’ body consists of undergraduate and graduate students of different American 
and Canadian universities who study for Finance or Business majors. These students have career 
aspiration of being a part of financial sector and related fields. Almost 90 percent of the students 
have already taken statistics, mathematics and calculus classes and are familiar with using 
spreadsheet.
7
 Prior to the work on Capital Structure project, the students learned the key financial 
concepts, such as the Time Value of Money, the concept of Cost of Capital, the basics of 
valuation and different theories of Capital Structure.  
The students sample covered a total of 161 students. 39 students are from American 
universities and 122 students are from Canadian universities. All students had to find out the 
companies’ optimal D/E ratios, and use different capital structure theories to explain companies’ 
current capital structure strategies. We then reviewed students’ results and suggestions.  
We categorized students into four groups according to their level of grades.  
The first group contains 32 students with the grades from 90 to 100. The opinions of this 
group were considered as most important while making the conclusions about the report since 
this group is excellent in analyzing company’s capital structure. The students from this group 
thoroughly understood every theory and proposition of the Capital Structure learned during their 
class, thus they are considered to have no difficulty in evaluating which theory of the Capital 
                                                          
7  B.S Program details (2010). Retrieved October 21, 2010 from 
http://www.bridgeport.edu/academics/undergraduate/businessadminbs/default.aspx 
 
 21 
Structure the company has applied. Also, this group of students provided effective 
recommendations about the capital structure of the firm. 
The second group contains 66 students with the grades from 80 to 89. A general 
observation of this group showed that, most students can thoroughly understand the theories and 
propositions of the Capital Structure taught in the class, leaving some few exceptions. About 
fifty percent of the students in this group provided their recommendations regarding the capital 
structure of the firms.  
The third group contains 47 students with the grade from 70 to 79. Among them, only one 
third of the students can understand all the theories and propositions of the Capital Structure. The 
rest can only understand some of these theories and propositions. As a result, they could not 
analyze the correct capital structures of the firm. 
The forth and the last group contains students with the grades below 70. Most of the 
students could not thoroughly understand the theories of Capital Structure as a result their reports 
did not contain reasonable explanations of companies’ motivation on capital decisions. Their 
preferences of Capital Structure theories were vague. 
Our primary purpose is to get feedbacks from the students of different levels, and to help 
business students to better understand the capital structure theory. Information that we collected 
is new and very unique. Our sample contains both graduate students and undergraduate students, 
and students of different levels.  
Table 1. Students body 
Gender 
Female % Male % 
59 37% 102 63% 
Degree Undergraduate % Graduate % 
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122 76% 39 24% 
Student Nationality 
Asian % Others % 
51 32% 110 68% 
University Location 
Canada % US % 
122 76% 39 24% 
 
From Table 1 we can see that from the total of 161 students 59 are female (37%) and 102 
are male (63%). Also, we find that 51 students (32%) have Asian origin and 110 have non-asian 
origin. As we discuss in next chapter some individual attributes affect students’ results. For 
example, female students seem to have more theoretical knowledge than male students while 
male students have more practical experience. Also female students are relatively more 
conservative than males. A risk-loving student may prefer to keep high debt ratio to seek for high 
risk and higher benefits. So their responses are often very different from what they learn in 
school. Students of Asian origin tend to have slightly better mathematical skills than average 
students from other countries. It may influence the level of understanding of theories which 
require better technical knowledge. Also note that 98 students (61% of total population) had 
grades from 80% to 100%, which means that most of the respondents do have basic 
understanding of capital structure theory and provide a reasonable feedback. 
In the next chapter we discuss the results of the students’ projects with regard to capital 
structure theories discussed previously.  
5. Results from the Samples 
We divided all answers into following categories.  
 Student agrees with the theory and thinks it can explain the firm’s current capital 
structure situation 
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 Student supports the theory but feels that managers do not use it. 
 Student supports the theory but feels that it cannot be applied for that specific firm.  
 Student does not support the theory but thinks that managers mistakenly use this theory.  
 Student does not support the theory and thinks it does not apply for the company.  
 Student demonstrates misunderstanding of the theory. 
 Student has no opinion.  
                 Table 2. Students perception of capital structure theories
8
 
 
 
The results are presented in Table 2. We first consider theories that have most support among 
students. 
These are trade-off theory (126 students support theory including those who think the 
theory is used by the firm or it is not applicable or it is not used by managers), asymmetric 
information (111), agency cost (110) and flexibility (94). Numbers are quite similar for advanced 
students. This should be similar to managers’ survey. However, when we compare these numbers 
with managers’ opinion we find that managers mostly support flexibility idea. About 59.38% 
                                                          
8
 For detailed statistics see Appendix 2.  
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managers indicated financial flexibility as an important or very important factor of capital 
structure. The firms’ credit rating is another vital factor for managers.  
For making the students’ result objective, we checked every student’s paper. Based on 
their answers, we found some students did not have clear opinions or no opinions, so we put 
them into the no opinion category. Some answers demonstrated the misunderstanding of capital 
structure theories. We put them into the misunderstanding category. As follows from Table 2, the 
trade-off theory only has 3 students misunderstanding and 22 students with no opinion. Both 
numbers are the smallest ones among all theories. The reason, we believe, is that the trade-off 
theory is the most popular capital structure theory. Not only textbooks, but also teachers spend 
most time on this theory. Pecking order theory is a popular theory as well. However, there are 96 
students with no opinion about this theory, which is the most among all theories. This is probably 
because the pecking order theory is more complex than the trade-off theory. The pecking order 
theory, for example, does not have a formula, like the trade-off theory. When we compare 
managers and students, we eliminate misunderstanding and no opinion categories, to make the 
results more objective and reasonable. It is very hard to eliminate the subjective bias completely. 
However, we used different grade levels students’ answers, divided all answers into seven 
different categories, and considered the individual attributes to reduce the subjective bias 
problem.  
Trade-off Theory - from 161 students, 34 support the trade-off theory and believe it’s 
been used by managers of the company. There are also 69 students who support the theory, but 
think that it is not used by managers. 23 students support the trade-off theory and thought it was 
not applicable to company’s capital structure. The main reason is that most companies in the 
project operate in high-tech industries and they need to maintain a relatively low debt ratio to be 
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more flexible in future investments. 22 students have no opinion about trade-off theory. 3 
students misunderstand it and 10 students do not support the usage of trade-off theory. Also, 55 
students suggest the managers should adjust capital structure by increasing debt ratio. As the 
company grows, profits increase and separation between ownership and management becomes 
more important. Under this situation, managers should take advantage of debt. By increasing 
debt ratio, company would gain more benefit from tax shield and it will be less risk of managers’ 
complacency. The trade-off theory is the most supported theory among students, but, at the same 
time, has the largest number of students who think that managers do not use it. 
Most individual attributes do not affect the above conclusions significantly. However, 90% 
(35 in total) of graduate students support the trade-off theory, while only 75% (91 in total) of 
undergraduate students support the theory. The difference is about 15%. We think the reason is 
that graduate students’ calculation ability is better than undergraduate students. Trade-off theory 
requires much more calculations than other theories. Because both groups have very high level 
of support for the trade-off theory, we do not believe that the difference influences significantly 
our overall conclusions. 
Apparently managers have a similar opinion about trade-off theory, but there are a lot of 
differences in details. First, managers think the tax shield is moderately important when they 
made capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is the forth important factor (45% of 
managers support this idea) that affects the amount of debt for firms. It should be noted however 
that even the first factor (financial flexibility) has support of only 59% of managers. The main 
reason of the low percent is that the small and start-up companies do not use tax shield because 
of low profits. Also, managers do not care about bankruptcy costs (only 21% managers support 
it). However, managers are concerned about credit rating and earnings and cash flow volatility 
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when making capital structure decisions. These two factors are related to bankruptcy cost. 
Managers like credit rating idea because it affects directly the company ability to borrow money. 
They do not really look at the link between credit rating and expected bankruptcy costs. 50 
students thought that the cost of financial distress theory is relevant to companies’ capital 
structure since these companies were making a lot of profits every year and they do not want to 
increase the risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, these companies keep a low debt ratio. Overall we 
think that the trade-off theory and its education should be more focused on its practical aspects. 
In particular, students and managers should clearly understand how to calculate the expected 
bankruptcy costs. If managers would have more profound understanding of expected bankruptcy 
cost concept they would understand that there are other factors besides credit rating that affect 
expected bankruptcy cost. 
 Although only 10% of firms have strict target ratio, 34% have somewhat tight target and 
37% have flexible target. The trade-off theory believes firms have an optimal ratio, but firms are 
operating in a dynamic environment. Therefore, the target ratio can be flexible. We think that 
much more time in education should be spent on the dynamic version of trade-off theory 
although that can be challenging because the new dominant direction here has not yet emerged. 
Secondly we feel that another line of research should analyze why in practice taxes do not seem 
to be important for capital structure (less than 50% of managers support the idea despite its 
simplicity). Thirdly, the textbook should add methods to calculate expected bankruptcy cost. 
Otherwise students do not know how to judge the benefits from reducing the cost of bankruptcy.  
Agency Cost - from 161 students, 58 support the Agency Cost theory and believe it’s 
been used by managers of the company. 31 support the theory though they do not think it is 
applicable to the company. Most of them thought that there was no agency cost existing between 
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managers and stockholders for those companies because the latter did not have a separation of 
management and ownership. We found that most of these 31 students are from Asia. We think 
that the reason for why students of Asian origin may not recognize potential agency problems is 
twofold. On one hand agency theories of capital structure were developed later than other 
theories, they are still to be popularized in countries such as China and so we think these students 
did not hear much about these problems during their previous studies. Secondly, most of Asian 
firms traditionally did not have a separation of management and ownership. We think that 
educators (especially in classes with a significant fraction of students of Asian origin) should 
remember about this point and should find cardinally new ways of teaching agency problems to 
them. 21 students support the theory however they think that the theory is not being used by 
managers. The main reason is that managers do not want to be disturbed by creditors when they 
invest money in some risky projects (assets substitution problem). 6 students do not support 
agency cost theory and 30 students have no opinion about it. 15 students demonstrated a 
misunderstanding of agency cost theory. Last two numbers are the largest ones among all 
theories. We think that educators need to give students more information about agency cost 
theory to make it less confusing. One problem related to agency cost is that it is difficult to have 
a formula similar to the trade-off theory. This makes agency cost theory difficult to apply as a 
tool used in the real capital structure decisions.  
Managers do not support the asset substitution idea. In addition, there is little evidence that 
executives issue short-term debt to minimize asset substitution problems. Also there is little 
evidence that firms discipline managers by issuing debt. However, we think that managers’ 
opinion with regard to agency cost importance in debt policy can be biased since it may 
indirectly provide (in managers’ view) a signal about their wrong choice of investment projects 
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etc. A suggestion for future surveys is to not ask direct questions about agency cost but rather 
offer managers a choice among different practical situations which will implicitly include 
scenarios of agency costs (not necessarily all of them). Perhaps such a survey can reveal more 
information about true managers’ attitude toward agency cost. One can also try to survey 
shareholders or banking employees about the importance of this aspect of financing. 
Nevertheless we are convinced that teaching agency cost should go far beyond traditional 
approach where teachers (and textbooks) just provide an intuitive idea such as for example that 
absence of debt can make managers lazy or too much debt creates an asset substitution problem. 
Professors should necessarily incorporate practical cases in their lectures when teaching these 
topics.  
Asymmetric Information - from 161 students, 67 support the Asymmetric information 
theory and believe it’s been used by managers of the company. 17 support the theory though they 
do not think it is applicable to the company. 27 students support the theory however they think 
that the theory is not being used by managers. 31 students have no opinion about Asymmetric 
information theory. 10 students had misunderstandings and 9 students do not support use of 
Asymmetric information theory. The main idea among students who support asymmetric 
information theory is that the companies are not willing to send an adverse signal to outsiders 
when issuing securities. For example, many companies maintain a very low debt ratio in order to 
let the investors know that their company had a lot of internal funds to support the companies’ 
daily operation and investments. Managers’ opinion is partly consistent with this idea. They are 
concerned about stock undervaluation when choosing capital structure (especially large 
companies). However as concluded by Graham and Harvey (2001) they do not necessarily relate 
this concern to informational asymmetry problem. This is similar to expected bankruptcy cost 
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idea. Managers do not understand bankruptcy costs while they affect managers’ decisions 
indirectly (through other factors). 
Our opinion about asymmetric information theory is very similar to considered above 
agency theory. A relatively high number of students misunderstand the theory. The theory is 
quite challenging technically though it is strongly supported by good and very good students. We 
believe that educators should find ways of teaching asymmetric information theory more 
effectively. At the same time they need to teach how to apply this theory in practice. When 
educators will be able to teach theory along with how to apply the theory in practice, students 
and managers will have more confidence towards the theory. Currently educators teaching 
asymmetric information focus largely on ideas.  
Debt and Discipline - from 161 students, 37 support the debt and discipline theory and 
believe it’s been used by managers of the company. Most students (47 students) support the 
theory though they do not think it is applicable to the company. This is because most companies 
belong to high-tech industries and have low debt ratio because financial flexibility is very 
important. 30 students support the theory however they think that the theory is not used by 
managers. 44 students have no opinion about debt and discipline theory. 15 students 
demonstrated misunderstandings of this theory. Only one student does not support the theory. He 
explains that the company is earning a lot of profit and maintaining a very low debt ratio would 
not make managers complacent. 
The fact that students support debt and discipline theory is not consistent with managers’ 
opinion. Our thoughts about managers’ opinion here are similar to those regarding asset 
substitution problem described above. In other words, managers’ opinion with regard to debt and 
discipline idea can be biased since it may indirectly provide (in managers’ view) a signal about 
 30 
their complacency etc. Since students support debt and discipline idea we are not convinced that 
this idea should be excluded from capital structure education. It seems like teachers spend much 
more time on teaching traditional agency cost of debt such as asset substitution problem and 
spend much less time on teaching debt and discipline.  
Firm Flexibility - from 161 students, 76 support the firm flexibility theory and believe 
it’s been used by managers of the company. 11 support the theory though they do not think it is 
applicable to the company. 7 students support the theory however they think that the theory is 
not being used by managers. 62 students have no opinion about Firm Flexibility theory. 3 
students misunderstand the idea and 1 student does not support it. Among 94 students that 
support the firm flexibility theory, there are 50 female students, which constitutes 85% of the 
total number of female students. Also there are 44 male students, which is only 43% of the total 
number of male students. The main reason, we believe, is that female students are more 
conservative than male. If small and risky firms issue debt instead of issuing equity, they would 
face much more bankruptcy risk. Female students are not comfortable with increasing 
bankruptcy risk. Among all the theories, Firm Flexibility gains the most support from managers’ 
side (59%). It is very important that every firm keeps reasonable financial flexibility for future 
projects. However, the level of flexibility differs across industries and business growth stages. 38 
students support future flexibility theory and its influence on company’s capital structure. 
Among these 38 students, there are 16 students who think that this is relevant to company’s 
capital structure. The main reason they gave out is that the companies like Yahoo, Amazon, 
Microsoft, Google, EBay and Apple are all belong to high-tech industry. These companies are 
operating in high tech growing industries. Thus they have to prepare for future changes by 
maintaining a low debt ratio. This idea is fully consistent with managers’ opinion. As to firms’ 
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growth stages, companies in development stage should keep larger flexibility than those who are 
in more mature stage, because young firms should be more prepared for future expansion. On 
education side teachers should spend more time on teaching flexibility theory mostly because 
quite high number of students (62) does not have any opinion about this theory and because 
managers really support this theory. We think that this is mostly because textbooks do not 
explain this theory with the same passion and effort as standard theories such as trade-off theory 
and pecking-order theory. A challenge for professors and textbooks here is that the flexibility 
theory of capital structure does not seem to be as rigorous as the main theories. Often it is 
presented just as a “nice” idea. Furthermore the flexibility idea often is taught as a part of 
pecking –order theory since the latter also recommends avoiding debt financing in favor of 
internal financing. The motifs however are different in both cases. So our feeling is that teaching 
only theory results and implications without really focusing on assumptions and fundamental 
ideas behind each theory has drawbacks especially in the long term. In the end, it leads to 
students’ confusion and in it makes difficult real life decisions for managers. In real life 
managers should be able to make adjustments to the theories they learn in school. However, 
making such adjustments without understanding the essential part of each idea can lead to wrong 
interpretations of what can happen in reality and consequently to wrong decisions. To 
summarize, teaching of firm flexibility theory should be improved. And researchers should 
discover why managers prefer flexibility over main theories.   
Life Cycle Theory - from 161 students, 76 support the Life Cycle theory and believe it’s 
been used by managers of the company. 12 support the theory though they do not think it is 
applicable to the company. 10 students support the theory however they think that the theory is 
not being used by managers. 58 students have no opinion about Life Cycle theory. 2 students 
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misunderstand the life cycle theory. In best students group, a lot of students think managers do 
not use this theory enough. Generally speaking, however, students support it and think it has 
been used. 
The data shows that the managers do not support and do not use the life cycle theory. Also 
the data shows that there is no difference between start-up and mature firms in terms of this 
theory importance for them. However, according to the theory, the results from start-up 
companies and mature companies should have significant differences. It was mentioned in 
previous chapters that in recent years some new research emerged regarding life cycle theory. It 
is not clear at this point though whether this theory should be taught as a separate theory or as a 
combination of arguments from other theories (mostly trade-off theory and agency). 
Pecking Order Theory - from 161 students, 46 support the pecking order theory and 
believe it’s been used by managers of the company. 9 support the theory though they do not 
think it is applicable to the company.  7 students support the theory however they think that the 
theory is not being used by managers. Those students who considered the pecking order theory to 
be relevant mostly argue that the managers prefer to use internal funds over external financing 
because there is less risk for company to use internal funds. 3 students misunderstood the 
pecking-order theory. 96 students (60%) have not mentioned this theory in their reports that is 
quite surprising. This can be explained by theory’s difficulty. Among 96 students who have not 
mentioned the pecking order theory, there are 79 undergraduate students, which is 65% of total 
number of undergraduate students, and there are 17 graduate students, which is 44% of total 
number of graduate students. We believe that compared to undergraduate students, graduate 
students may have some work experiences or internship experiences to help them to understand 
this theory. Managers’ opinion is partly consistent with theory. They prefer internal funds and 
 33 
often they are concerned about stock undervaluation when choosing capital structure (especially 
large companies). However, as concluded by Graham and Harvey (2001), they do not necessarily 
relate this concern to informational asymmetry problem. For example, managers in high-tech 
industry or companies in development stage prefer to use internal funds when raising capital due 
to concerns of maximizing cash flow in the future. That can be interpreted as a misunderstanding 
of the modern concept of firm objective which is firm’s value maximization.  
          We feel that in order to get more appreciation from students and managers, pecking-order 
theory should be taught in more practical way. Teachers should be able to explain how this 
theory can be used when making practical decisions. There is no doubt that this theory has 
interesting insights but its applications in real world should be taught better.  
6. Conclusion 
         Graham and Harvey (2001) argue that managers take decisions based on the current 
financial situation, and such criteria as financial flexibility and credit ratings. Educators should 
spend more time on teaching all these factors especially given that some of them have become 
quite important in theoretical research as well. Another reason for the gap between theory and 
practice is that educators focus mostly on normative aspects of theory, and not on positive 
aspects of theory and its applications. As a result students may be aware about existing models 
but are not able to apply these models in real life when they become managers. We feel that this 
is especially true for asymmetric information and agency cost theories which are without doubt 
most complicated theories technically. Educators should find a way to explain practical 
applications of those theories. 
With regard to the gap in researchers’ opinion, educational practices favor the trade-off 
theory to asymmetric information based theories and agency theories. This should be corrected. 
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Students who do not study hard are similar to managers in terms of mentioning trade-off theory 
more frequently compared to asymmetric information. Good students still like trade-off theory 
but also have quite a positive opinion about asymmetric information, firm flexibility or agency 
based theories as well.  
 In terms of debate about future development of capital structure theory, we feel that 
existing asymmetric information theories are not sufficient and this is the reason why these 
theories have less support than the trade-off theory among managers and students. At the same 
time given that the gap between theory and practice is very large, so the door is still widely open 
for new theory of capital structure which can be helpful to make a bridge between managers and 
students which can be helpful to the future students to know more clear about capital structure.       
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Appendix 1 
              
              
  
PROJECT: COST OF CAPITAL AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS 
     
              Choose a firm from the list of firms you are working with in your investment game. 
      You can find its financial statement information from the 
website 
        of "Market Insight": www.mhhe.com/edumarketinsight.  
        In addition, if you choose to, you can obtain additional information, either from the company itself or from other 
websites. 
   For example, use web-links on the course Blackboard site. 
        
              Use this information to analyse the cost of capital and capital structure of your firm. 
      This is a team 
case. 
            
              
              The report should answer the following questions (a total of 10-15 pages not including tables is recommended): 
   1. General information (15%) 
           
 
background information including the firm's objectives and history (major events, for instance when  
the firm became public corporation) 
 
current business situation (product line, major competitors and the market situation) 
     
 
brief description of the firm's organization chart and the top-management team 
     2. Ownership structure (15%) 
           
 
Major shareholders 
           
 
Information about shares and stock options owned by management 
      
              
              Next questions will be based on the spreadsheet analysis of capital structure using the template that you can get 
   from this file (it's called "Calculations") which currently contain the Oracle example.  
      This spreadsheet must be printed and presented in total(!) in a readible (reduced) format. 
     The weight of spreadsheet analysis is 
30% 
          Answer the following 
questions:  
           
              3. What is the firm's current debt/equity ratio (based on table 3 from "Calculations") ? (10%) 
     
 
  
            4. In your opinion, is the firm's debt/equity ratio high or low?  
        Compare the debt/equity ratio with other firms at the same industry or related industries (10%) 
     (use industry report available in edumarketinsight) 
         
              5. Is the firm's current debt/equity ratio explained by the firm's financial policy or by the current market conditions? 
(10%) 
   Look at the firm's debt/equity ratio over the last few years (in book values it can be found, for instance, in  
edumarketinsight). 
  
              
 40 
6. What is the firm's optimal capital structure according to WACC aproach (based on tables 4 and 5 from  
"Calculations") (10%) 
  Provide your 
recommendations 
           You should method of trial and error when working on this questions. Change values in yellow columns 
    
              7. (bonus question-up to 10%) If current debt/equity ratio different from optimal, then 
      what factors, in your opinion, which are not taken into consideration in the Spreadsheet analysis 
     may explain this difference (i.e. which factors may affect the firm's capital structure policy)?  
     Use information from questions 1 and 2, lecture notes and your 
imagination 
       
              
              
                    
             
              The deadline for submitting the report is 1-30 p.m., November 
22 
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Appendix 2 
Table 1. Aggregate table for all projects 
Theory Supports
/used 
Supports
/not 
used 
Theory not 
Applicable 
to firm 
Does not 
support/use
d 
Does not 
support/no
t used 
Misund
erstandi
ng 
No 
Opini
on 
Trade-Off 
Theory 
34 69 23 1 9 3 22 
Asymmetric 
Information 
67 27 17 4 5 10 31 
Pecking 
Order 
Theory 
46 7 9 0 0 3 96 
Agency Cost 58 21 31 2 4 15 30 
Debt and 
Discipline  
37 30 47 0 1 2 44 
Life Cycle 
Theory 
76 10 12 1 2 2 58 
Firm 
Flexibility 
76 7 11 0 2 3 62 
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Table 2. Aggregate table for excellent students (Grading from 90 to 100) 
Theory Supports
/used 
Supports
/not 
used 
Theory not 
Applicable 
to firm 
Does not 
support/use
d 
Does not 
support/no
t used 
Misund
erstandi
ng 
No 
Opini
on 
Trade-Off 
Theory 
12 11 7 1 0 0 1 
Asymmetric 
Information 
11 4 2 0 0 0 15 
Pecking 
Order 
Theory 
14 4 6 0 0 1 7 
Agency Cost 15 2 1 0 1 1 12 
Debt and 
Discipline  
9 9 4 0 0 2 8 
Life Cycle 
Theory 
9 10 5 0 1 0 7 
Firm 
Flexibility 
19 5 1 0 0 0 7 
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Table 3. Aggregate table for students except excellent students 
Theory Supports
/used 
Supports
/not 
used 
Theory not 
Applicable 
to firm 
Does not 
support/use
d 
Does not 
support/no
t used 
Misund
erstandi
ng 
No 
Opini
on 
Trade-Off 
Theory 
22 58 16 0 9 3 21 
Asymmetric 
Information 
56 23 15 4 5 10 16 
Pecking 
Order 
Theory 
32 3 3 0 0 2 89 
Agency Cost 45 19 30 2 3 14 18 
Debt and 
Discipline  
28 21 43 0 1 0 36 
Life Cycle 
Theory 
67 7 0 1 1 2 51 
Firm 
Flexibility 
57 2 10 0 2 3 55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
